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June 14, 2024

of default must inform the tenant of “the conduct

required to prevent eviction.”

Thereafter, this language was picked up and quoted

in several lower court decisions, each of which cited

Westhampton.

In those cases, there was no issue as to whether

the notice instructed the tenant how to cure. For

example, in Shore Lane Arms Owners Corp. v. Mazza,

26 Misc.3d 1222(A), 907 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Civ. Ct. Kings

Co. 2010), and First Hous. Co., Inc. v. Orozco, 2019

N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4216, 2019 Slip Op. 51224(U)(Civ.

Ct. Queens Co. 2019) the notices alleged that the ten-

ants engaged in prohibited subletting.

In S&M Bronx Inc. v. Mosholu Petrol Realty LLC,

3022 NYLJ Lexis 134 (Sup. Ct. Bx. Co. 2022) the

notice alleged that the tenant had failed to obtain

required insurance.

In BP 510 Madison LLC v. Prosiris Capital Mgt. LLC,

65 Misc. 3d 1222(A), 119 N.Y.S.3d 393 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.

Co. 2019) the notice alleged that the tenant had failed

to pay rent.

In those cases, the tenants did not need instructions

on how to cure, it was self-evident. And yet, in each

of these decisions, the courts cited Westhampton

for the proposition that the notice must apprise the

tenant of “the conduct required to prevent eviction.”

Similarly, in Zagorski v. Koenigsamen, 2019 N.Y.

Misc. Lexis 4087 (Civ. Ct. Kings. Co. 2019) the Court

dismissed a holdover proceeding where the notice

of default was “replete with generalizations”, failed to

“alleg[e] with specificity the conduct of which it com-

plains” and “nowhere designated the provisions of the

lease under which it is being issued.” That is an apt

re-statement of the Court of Appeals’ straightforward

Chinatown test. And yet, citing Westhampton, the Court

went on to state that a notice to cure must inform the

tenant of “the conduct required to prevent eviction.”

This contrast between the straightforward China-

town test and the supposed additional requirement

that the notice “instruct” the tenant how to cure has

come to a head in recent lower court cases.

In 985 Bruckner Blv. Owners LLC v. Fuentes, 2022

N.Y. Misc. Lexis 6195, 2022 NY Slip Op. 51054(U)

(Civ Ct. Bx. Co. 2022), the notice of default con-

tained eight numbered paragraphs specifying

alleged objectionable conduct. The tenant moved to

dismiss on the grounds “that the notice to cure does

not advise what must be done to cure the alleged

breach/conduct.”

The court rejected that argument, holding “A cure

occurs when the specified conduct stops.” It recog-

nized, we would say correctly, that where the notice

specifies the facts constituting the alleged default,

that specification of the facts places the tenant in a

position to cure. See also Riverbay Corp. v. Frere, 2022

N.Y. Misc. Lexis 6195, 2022 NY Slip Op. 51054(U)(Civ

Ct. Bx. Co. 2022) (“A cure occurs when the specified

violations cease.”)

However, in 2150 Creston Ave, LLC v. Marte, 2023

N.Y. Misc. Lexis 2590, 2023 NY Slip Op. 31752(U)

(Civ. Ct. Bx. Co. 2023), the court came to the opposite

conclusion. The notice in that case alleged that the

tenant breached the lease by having built a wall in

a specified area of the apartment, thereby creating

an additional room, resulting in the NYC Dept. of

Housing Preservation and Development issuing a

violation against the landlord.

The tenant moved to dismiss, arguing that the

notice failed to apprise her of “what she must do

to cure the alleged breach.” The landlord argued

that the remedy was “whatever is necessary to cor-

rect the violation.” Citing Westhampton, the court

dismissed the case, holding that a notice to cure

“must be sufficiently specific in stating what the

tenant must do to remedy the alleged breach ….

By not including a specific statement as to what

respondent was required to do … the notice to cure

is unacceptably vague and confusing….”

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